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Refuting
"Relationship-Defined Obligations Means
Caring Only for One's Circle"


By Feng Xin-ming, 2010

(Contents Mostly Excerpted From: “The Traditional Chinese Supremacy of Relationship-Defined Obligations vs. The West's Supremacy of Love”)

反驳
“人伦至上时人们只顾圈子”


冯欣明著,2010年

(内容主要节录自:
《中华传统的人伦至上对西方的爱至上》)

"When relationship-defined obligations are supreme," some critics of the traditional Chinese supremacy of relationship-obligations say, "people will care only about relationships and not about right and wrong, justice, the law, or the public interest; people will care only about the rules and interests of their family, clan and narrow circles. That's why in Mainland China people often have no trustworthiness, honesty or integrity; they enrich themselves by taking public property; they practice corruption and fraud, disregard the law, and care only about guanxi (relationships, often unprincipled). It's all thanks to Confucianism's supremacy of relationship-defined obligations and supremacy of guanxi relationships."

This criticism is a distortion of the supremacy of relationship-defined obligations, and a very serious distortion. What is sad is that, both inside and outside China, this distortion is very widespread, the theory is very popular and many people accept it as fact.

No, the supremacy of relationship-defined obligations should definitely not be misunderstood as putting family, clan and circle above right and wrong or above the law, to be rejecting, "for the sake of family, clan and circle", honesty, integrity and trustworthiness, or to be engaging in corruption and fraud.

All traditional Chinese relationship-defined obligations are consistent with justice, morality, and trustworthiness. Obligations contrary to justice, morality and trustworthiness cannot be traditional Chinese relationship-defined obligations. For example, a relationship-defined obligation is that offspring must be xiao or good to parents, and the first tenet in xiao is to uphold the good name of one's parents and ancestors. If to be xiao or good to parents involves going against justice, morality, or trustworthiness, then won't that besmirch the good name of one's parents and ancestors? Can that then still be called xiao or being good to parents? No, of course not. Also, human relationships don't involve only family, clan and "circle", there is at least also that first of the "Five Cardinal Relationships": the relationship between "ruler and subject" or between government and the citizens. The first demand this relationship makes on citizens is that they obey the law, and law is nothing but some rules and regulations set forth by the government based on justice, morality and trustworthiness. Indeed, that relationship-defined obligations are always consistent with justice, morality, and trustworthiness is determined by the very structure of the thought framework of the supremacy of relationship-defined obligations.

In fact, if one's parents ask one to do something that goes against justice, morality and trustworthiness, then one's parents are wrong, and making such an unjust request itself is an act against morality. What are the obligations of the offspring here? Is it to obey the parents' unjust request and act against justice, morality and trustworthiness? No, of course not. And to say yes would be to distort the meaning of relationship-defined obligations. When asked whether to be xiao one needed to always obey one's parents Confucius exclaimed, "What kind of talk is that! What kind of talk is that!" (Chapter 15, "Dissuading and Disputing", Xiao Jing (Classic of Xiao).) Yes, according to relationship-defined obligations, the obligations of the offspring in such a case is to dissuade the parents, and to persist until successful. Otherwise, it's known as "sycophantically obeying and thus entrapping one’s parents in moral unrighteousness". In the Confucian classics this is an extremely serious transgression against xiao. (See Annotation by Zhao Qi of the Han Dynasty on Mencius (Meng Zi), Chapter Li Lou, “The Thirteen Classics Annotated”, published by Zhonghua Shudian, Beijing, 1980, Vol. II, p.2,723.)

Therefore, relationship-defined obligations can only be obligations that are in accord with justice, morality, and trustworthiness. If not, then such "obligations" are not really relationship-defined, but are the result of misunderstandings or distortions of relationship-defined obligations.

As for obeying the law, as pointed out above, the law is merely some rules and regulations set forth by the government based on justice, morality and trustworthiness, and since relationship-defined obligations always require that one adhere to justice, morality and trustworthiness, then relationship-defined obligations must always require that one abide by the law. Persons glorified in Chinese history such as Bao Gong, Hai Rui, haven't they all strictly abided by and enforced law in the face of the powerful? Also, the first of the Five Cardinal Relationships is that between the "rulers", that is, the government, and the "subjects", that is, the citizens, and the first relationship-defined obligation of "subjects" is to obey the law. There should be no conflict between obeying the law and the interests of family, clan and "circle" (friends). If one uses illegal means to obtain some undeserved benefit for family, clan and "circle" (friends), then one is actually harming them by entrapping them in a collaboration with immorality. This entrapment besmirches their and their family's good names, and causes them to be punished by the law when the illegalities come to light.

Here it must be clarified that in the Chinese tradition, when the ruler, government or government leaders carry out wrong policies and enact wrong law, i.e. policies and law opposed to morality and justice, the subjects' duty is to clearly voice their dissent and to try to dissuade the ruler, government or government leaders, but this does not mean it's alright to disobey the law. Throughout Chinese history there have been many subjects who have been lauded as loyal heroes for voicing dissent and trying to dissuade the rulers, but these heroes obey the government and the law even when engaging in dissent and dissuasion, which are conducted through legal channels. Only when the rulers or government and government leaders become immoral and incompetent beyond all hope, when the country is grossly misgoverned and law and order breaks down, only then is the government considered to have "lost the mandate of heaven" and only then does it become the right of the subjects to disobey the law and rise up in revolution to overthrow the government.

At any rate, only by adhering to justice, morality, trustworthiness and law can one be truly good to family, clan and "circle". Again, according to the Confucian tradition such as expressed in the Xiao Jing (Classic of Xiao), to be considered truly xiao, i.e. to be considered truly good to parents, one's conduct at work and in interactions with people outside the family must all be good, because upholding the good name of the parents and ancestors, or even better, bringing glory to the family name, is a most important requirement in being good to parents and ancestors. Therefore, the interests of the family, clan and "circle" can never oppose adherence to law, morality, and trustworthiness. On the contrary, to be truly good to family, clan and "circle", one must adhere to justice, morality, trustworthiness and law.

Furthermore, in the world of relationship-defined obligations, such obligations are not confined to family, clan and "circle", but apply to all human relationships. All human relationships come within the realm of relationship-defined obligations and come with obligations that must be carried out. That means one must take care of all parties that one comes to have relationships with. As long as one come into contact with or have dealings with someone, then relationship-defined obligations govern that contact and those dealings. Between the employer and employee, one neighbor and another, the salesperson and the customer, the policeman and the citizen, etc., even if they aren't relatives, their contact and dealings are still all governed by relationship-defined obligations; they still can not bully, harm, steal from or defraud each other at will. When relationship-defined obligations are supreme, they operate wherever people have contact with other people. Thus the sphere of justice, morality, trustworthiness and obedience to law does not become narrower, but becomes wider. Therefore, that the supremacy of relationship-defined obligations does not lead to caring only for those who are close and disregarding justice, morality, trustworthiness and obedience to law, is determined by the very nature of relationship-defined obligations.

Therefore, the phenomena in Mainland China of corruption, lack of trustworthiness and lack of adherence to the law are a reflection not of the supremacy of relationship-defined obligations, but of exactly the opposite: the abandonment of relationship-defined obligations and the tenets of Confucianism. When relationship-defined obligations are supreme, people will certainly practice strict adherence to justice, morality, trustworthiness and law. Traditionally, haven't Chinese merchants always acted strictly in accordance with trustworthiness, keeping promises, and not cheating even the weak and helpless? The criticism that the supremacy of relationship-defined obligations leads to caring only about family, clan and "circle" is unfounded.

Also, that conclusion is derived from a completely wrong method of deduction. This deduction goes as follows: "The supremacy of relationship-defined obligations is based on relationships among people; therefore it is not based on justice, morality, trustworthiness or obedience to law; therefore it must care only about those in the closest relationships and disregard justice, morality, trustworthiness and law." Isn't this an absurd logic? If applied to the West's supremacy of love, then we would get this conclusion: "The supremacy of love is based on loving other people and therefore is not based on justice, morality, trustworthiness or obedience to law; therefore it must care only about those whom one loves and disregard justice, morality, trustworthiness and law"!

Of course, this distortion of the supremacy of love is also wrong, but is more reasonable than the similar distortion of the supremacy of relationship-defined obligations. That is because all dealings among people involve relationship-defined obligations, and so when relationship-defined obligations are supreme at no time will unjust and immoral behavior be permitted. The number of people one loves, however, is limited and so most dealings among people do not involve love, and so one can imagine that when love is supreme perhaps sometimes unjust and immoral behavior is permitted. Of course, this is fallacy, because the West's framework of the supremacy of love also has a lot of mechanisms to ensure that people don't disregard what is just and moral.

When it comes to Western thought, which is more appropriate for such an attack, no one has raised such a distortion, yet, when it comes to traditional Chinese thought, which is less appropriate for this kind of attack, this distortion has become very popular and has wide currency both inside and outside China. Alas, does this not show that, when it comes to such things, a lot of people nowadays are a bit biased?

Actually, being infected with this kind of incorrect bias is understandable. First, present-day Mainland China is on the whole still relatively poor and backward, and so people look down upon Chinese and the Chinese heritage. Also, the Mainland ideology had once fiercely denounced the "man-eating feudal old society", and to this day opposes "old feudal ways of thinking". Therefore, attacks on Chinese traditional thought are relatively easy to accept and believed. Furthermore, in present-day Mainland China not caring about right and wrong, not being trustworthy, disregard for the law, corruption, embezzlement, and so forth, are indeed relatively common. Although all this is not because of Confucianism but on the contrary, is to a great extent precisely because of the lack of Confucianism, most people nowadays not only don't know the Chinese classics, but also, because of inability to understanding the ancient prose style, aren't even capable of reading them. So they follow what others say and mistake the supremacy of relationship-defined obligations for disregard of justice and morality. In my opinion, however, the supremacy of relationship-defined obligations is such an excellent thought framework that it cannot be suppressed much longer and will soon once again ascend mankind's stage and play a main role.

一些批评中华人伦至上传统的人说:“当人伦至上时,人们只顾关系,只顾家人、家族和狭窄圈子,以及其中的规矩和利益,不顾正义和公道,不顾法律和公益。所以现在中国大陆人们很多时没有诚信,假公济私,贪污欺骗,不守法律,只知道拉关系,都是因为孔教的人伦至上,关系至上。”

这项批评是对人伦至上的曲解,而且是很严重的曲解啊!可叹的是,这曲解在中国和外国都很普遍,说法很吃香,很多人都视之为事实。

不,绝不应该把人伦至上曲解为不顾正义和法律,只顾家人、家族和“圈子”,而为了家人、家族和“圈子”就会抛弃诚信、就会贪污、行骗。

所有人伦定义的义务和责任都是符合正义和诚信的,如果违反正义和诚信的话,就不可能是人伦定义的。例如,人伦规定,子女对父母要孝(对父母和祖先好),而孝的第一条就是要保持父母和祖先的声誉。如果对父母所谓孝而违反正义和诚信,不就是败坏了父母和祖先的声誉吗?还能是孝(对父母好)吗?不能的。而且,人伦关系里不仅有家人、家族、和圈子,另外还有“五伦”中的第一伦,那就是“君臣”,亦即是政府与人民之间的人伦关系。这个人伦关系对人民的第一项要求就是要遵守法律,而法律则不过是政府基于正义和诚信而成立的一些条例和规章而已。的确,人伦所定义的义务和责任必然符合正义和诚信,这是人伦至上的思想结构本身所决定的。

如果父母要求子女做违反正义和诚信的事,那么父母就是错误了,作出这种要求本身就是做了违反道义的事情,子女这时的义务和责任是什么呢?是听从父母错误的要求,做出违反正义和诚信的事情吗?不,这样做就把人伦完全曲解了,被问孝是不是只管服从父母时,孔子就喊叫,“这是什么说话啊!这是什么说话啊!(是何言与!是何言与!)”(见《孝经》“谏诤章第十五”。)根据人伦的规定,子女这时的义务和责任就是劝谏父母,还要坚持,直到成功为止。不然的话,就是“阿意曲从,陷亲不义”了,在孔教经典里,这是非常的、极大的不孝。(见汉朝赵岐对《孟子:离娄篇》的注疏,“十三经注疏”,中华书店北京1980版,下集第2723页。)

所以,人伦所要求人们履行的义务和责任,只可能是符合正义和诚信的义务和责任。否则的话,必定不是人伦所真正要求的,而是对人伦所要求误会或曲解而得出来的。

至于守法,如上文所指出,法律不过是政府基于正义和诚信而成立的一些条例和规章而已,所以既然人伦必会符合正义和诚信,那么人伦必会规定人们遵守法律。中华历史上歌颂的包公、海瑞等人,不都是铁面无私、不惧权贵、严守法则的吗?同时,五伦的第一项人与人关系就是“君臣”,即政府和人民的关系,而人民对政府的第一项义务和责任,就是遵守法律。遵守法律跟履行对家人、家族、和朋友(圈子)的义务和责任是没有冲突的。反而,如果用犯法的手段来为家人、家族、和朋友谋一些不应该得到的不义之财,便是把他们“陷于不义”。这只能伤害他们而已。陷于不义,便把他们和他们家族的好声誉垢污,而且不法行为暴露时他们也会被法律惩罚。

这里要澄清一件事情:中华传统里,当“君主”即政府或政府领导人执行错误的政策或成立错误的法律时,臣民的责任是对君主明确地提出异见,进行劝谏,但这并不是提倡不遵从法律。中国历史里有很多被歌颂为忠臣的英雄,都是对“君主”勇敢地提出异见、进行劝谏的,但是,就算是进行劝谏时,他们都遵从政府和法律,劝谏都是通过合法途径的。中华传统里,只有当政府的无道和无能,达到了没有希望的地步、国家被严重地错误统治、治安和法纪破坏时,只有这时才可以说政府“失去了天命”,而只有这时人民才有权违反法律,起来进行革命,推翻政府。

总之,只有遵守正义、诚信和法律,才是对家人、家族和“圈子”真正的好。孝就是对父母和祖先好,而根据孔教传统,好像《孝经》所规定一样,要在工作岗位上和跟家庭以外人们相处的行为都好,才能算为真正的孝。这是因为保持父母和祖先的声誉,或甚至更好地,耀扬“家声”(家族的名声),是对父母和祖先好的最重要一条。所以,不能把家人、家族和“圈子”跟正义、诚信和法律对立起来。相反,人伦至上思想构架里,要对家族和“圈子”好,就一定要遵守正义、诚信和法律。

人伦世界里,人伦关系并不限于家人、家族和“圈子”,而是包括所有人与人关系。所有人与人关系都属于人伦范围之内,都具有须要履行的义务和责任,那就是说,都要照顾这些跟自己有关系的各方。 只要跟任何人有接触,有来往,便有人伦定义的义务和责任来规范。雇主和雇员、邻居和邻居、售货员和顾客、警察和平民等等,虽然不是亲人,但他们的接触来往也仍然有人伦的规范,也不可以进行欺凌、伤害或偷骗。人伦至上时,人伦在所有人与人接触的范围里都运行。这样,正义、诚信和守法的范围不是变为更狭窄,而是变为更广泛了。所以,人伦至上不会只顾亲近自己的人而漠视正义、诚信和守法,这是由人伦至上的本质所决定的。

所以,现代中国大陆贪污、不诚信和不守法等现象,并不是因为华人信奉人伦至上,而是完全相反,是因为华人遗弃了人伦至上、忘记了孔教信条。人伦至上的时候,人们必定会严格遵守正义、诚信和法律。以前传统的华人商人不都是诚信至上,一诺千金,童叟无欺的吗?指责人伦至上令人们只顾亲人而不顾正义这个批评,是不能成立的。

而且,把人伦至上说为令人只顾亲人而不顾正义,也是用完全错误的推理方式得出结论的。这个推理方式就是:“人伦至上是基于人与人的关系的,所以不是基于正义的,所以一定只顾关系亲近的人而漠视正义。”这不是荒谬的逻辑吗?如果用于西方的爱至上思想构架,就得出这个结论了:“西方的爱至上是基于爱的,所以不是基于正义的,所以一定只顾心爱的人而漠视正义”!

当然,这样曲解爱至上也是错误,但总比曲解人伦至上较为有理。这是因为跟任何人接触都涉及人伦,所以人伦至上不可能有时会容许对某些人进行不正义的行为。但是,一个人所爱的人数量有限,所以跟多数人接触时就不会涉及爱,因此能够想像到,爱至上有可能有时会容许对某些人进行不正义的行为。当然,这也是谬论,因为西方的爱至上思想构架里,也有很多机制,使人们不会漠视正义。

对更为合适这样攻击的西方思想,这种曲解就没有人提出来,反而对比较不那么合适这样攻击的中华人伦至上传统思想,这种曲解却在中国和外国都很吃香,有很大市场。唉,这不是反映了当今很多人们,看待这种事物是抱着一点成见的吗?

其实,被这种错误成见感染,也是能够理解的。首先,现在中国大陆总的来说,还是比较贫穷落后,人们便看不起华人和华人传统。加上,大陆的意识形态曾经激烈斥责“吃人的封建旧社会”,现在也仍然反对“封建旧思想”。所以,对中华传统思想的评击,中外人们都比较容易接受,信以为真。而且现在中国大陆,不理会正义、不守诚信、不守法、贪污作弊等,也的确比较普遍。虽然这不是因为有了孔教,而相反地在很大程度上是因为没有了孔教,但是,多数人对中华经典书籍不但根本不认识,而且因为不晓文言文,连看也看不懂,所以很多人便人云亦云,便都把人伦至上曲解为不讲正义了。但是,曲解再吃香也毕竟是曲解。依我看来,人伦至上思想构架这么优秀,是不能再抑制多久的,很快它便会再登上人类舞台,重新担演主角了。


 
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